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THE 2000 TAX REFORM IN CROATIA: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES**
This paper represents an attempt to identify the key features of the 
Croatian tax system (such as the level of collected tax revenues, the overall tax 
burden, personal income tax progression and the composition of tax revenues) 
after the 2000 tax reform(s). It compares its performance to that of the old tax 
system that was in force from 1994 through 2000, as well as to the proclaimed 
goals of the tax reform. Some attention has also been devoted to the gradual 
erosion of the tax bases of personal and corporate income taxes and to the 
past, present and future consequences of such erosion to the creation of an 
“enabling environment” for foreign direct investment.
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Introduction
After the coalition government came to power in early 2000, it decided to 
abolish essential components of the existing tax system of direct taxes and initi-
ate a stepwise reform of taxation. The inherited tax system was a unique system 
of mutually consistent consumption-based personal and corporate income taxes1. 
Sandra Švaljek*
* S. Švaljek, dr. sc., znanstvena suradnica u Ekonomskom institutu, Zagreb.
** Nakon što smo u br. 9 i br. 11/2005. objavili uvodna izlaganja na Međunarodnoj konferenciji 
“Tax Systems in Competition and Countries in Transition”, u ovome broju nastavljamo s objavlji-
vanjem radova koji govore o iskustvima pojedinih zemalja u reformiranju poreznih sustava. Svi su 
prilozi prošli recenzentski postupak.
1 For details on Croatian tax system between 1994 and 2000 see, for example, Rose and Wisw-
esser (1998) or Schmidt, Wissel and Stöckler (1996).
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Although criticised for being incomparable with the tax systems of other countries 
in the neighbourhood, the old tax system was surprisingly well accepted in the 
business community, and it generated a quite satisfactory level of tax revenues.
This paper represents an attempt to identify the key features of the Croatian 
tax system after the 2000 tax reform(s). It will try to compare its performance to 
that of the old tax system that was in force from 1994 through 2000, as well as to 
the intended goals of the tax reform., Some attention will also be devoted to the 
gradual erosion of the tax bases of personal and corporate income taxes and to the 
past, present and future consequences of such erosion to the creation of an “enabling 
environment” for foreign direct investment.
The introductory part is followed by the second chapter, which reviews the 
arguments that were used in 2000 to justify the launch of the tax reform. Part three 
shows the impact of the new tax system on the overall tax burden, the level of col-
lected revenues from personal and corporate income taxes (both in absolute and 
relative terms), personal income tax progression and the structure of tax revenues. 
Part four focuses attention on the tax deductions introduced from 1994 onwards in 
order to provide incentives for domestic investors and turn Croatia into an attractive 
location for foreign direct investment. However, it also questions their effectiveness 
in achieving these goals. The fi nal chapter highlights the most important lessons 
that can be learned from the 2000 tax reform experience.  
Causes and goals of the 2000 tax reform in Croatia
The tax system that was introduced in 1994 (Offi cial Gazette Narodne novine 
109/1993) was a unique tax system based on the theoretical concept of the taxa-
tion of consumption. Besides VAT and excise taxes, its main components were 
direct taxes designed as taxes on consumption rather than income. The idea of 
taxing consumption rather than income, as far as direct taxes are concerned, was 
implemented through the taxation of interest-adjusted personal income and inter-
est-adjusted business profi ts (Schmidt, Wissel and Stöckler, 1996).
As in everyday life, uncommon solutions are not welcomed by the public and 
usually face prejudice and hostility. And so was the case with the Croatian tax sys-
tem. The tax system introduced in 1994 performed well by common standards, yet 
it was constantly blamed for suffering from all sorts of shortcomings. Unfortunately, 
few serious analyses on the macroeconomic effects of the tax system from 1994 
onwards were undertaken and the majority of pro and con arguments on the issue 
of the consumption-based tax system were mostly based on personal impressions 
and beliefs rather than evidence.
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The coalition government that came to power in early 2000 took the criticisms 
directed against the tax system seriously and decided to launch a tax reform that 
would gradually eliminate controversial features of the existing system. Govern-
ment offi cials justifi ed their actions by arguing that the existing tax system had 
serious drawbacks, e.g.:
- since the investment activity was sluggish in the period of its existence, 
the tax system was blamed for not providing a stimulating environment for 
investment, 
- since it seemed evident that, without it, government revenue from corporate 
income tax would have been higher, the deduction for the imputed cost of 
capital (protective interest) was blamed for causing losses of government 
revenue (at the same time, another criticism was that the tax rate of 35 
percent was set too high), 
- due to the existence of protective interest, which was not present in other 
tax systems, there was an impression that it was not possible to compare 
Croatian corporate income tax with those in the neighbourhood, 
- since its main components were indirect and personal income taxes with 
only two marginal tax rates, the overall tax system was criticised for being 
regressive,
- dividend relief was also seen as a cause of the state budget losses, 
- since protective interest increased with the increase in the equity of an 
enterprise, the corporate income tax was perceived as biased in favour of 
capital intensive enterprises2 .
The tax reform that started in late 2000 led to a complete redesign of the tax 
system, abandoning the idea of the taxation of consumption. The most striking 
feature of the direct tax reform was the abolition of protective interest and dividend 
relief. The statutory corporate income tax rate was reduced from 35 to 20 percent. 
Instead of two marginal tax rates of personal income tax (20 and 35 percent), fi rst 
three and then, as of 2003, four marginal tax rates have been applied, ranging from 15 
to 45 percent. The basic personal allowance was raised from 1,000 kuna to 1,250 and 
then to 1,500 kuna (NN/127/2000). A series of revisions of tax regulations passed 
in the period 2000 to 2004, introduced several tax exemptions and deductions into 
the system of direct taxation. Other taxes like VAT, social security contributions 
and local taxes were also subject to minor or even major changes.
The goals of the tax reform explicitly expressed by the coalition government 
were promotion of both domestic and foreign direct investment that would enhance 
2 These criticisms can be found in the accompanying documents prepared by the Ministry of 
Finance for the new tax bills submitted for parliamentary procedure.
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employment, introduction of more pronounced personal income tax progression 
and taxation based on the “ability to pay” principle, simplifi cation of the tax system 
and its comparability with other contemporary tax systems, as well as harmonisa-
tion with the tax systems of the EU countries. Implicitly, the tax reform was also 
aimed at correcting the shortcomings of the previous tax system.
It would be interesting to see whether the tax reform has achieved both its 
explicit and implicit goals. Some conclusions on that can be more easily drawn 
from the analysis presented in this paper. It is, however, certain that even if the goals 
(such as recovery of investment or rise in employment) have been achieved, fi rstly, 
they cannot be attributed solely to the tax system and secondly, they could have 
been achieved only by chance since no simulations of the possible effects of the tax 
changes were conducted prior to their introduction. Moreover, as shown by Keen 
and King (2002), much of the criticism directed towards the old tax system could 
be easily refuted. Most of the shortcomings that were cited in regards to the old 
tax system simply did not exist, so that the new tax system had to correct the non-
existing failures of the previous one. In addition, the criticism of the old corporate 
income tax that protective interest created losses to the government and provided 
generous tax relief seemed to be in direct contradiction to the goal of enhancing 
investment and employment through tax incentives and lower tax rates. 
Macroeconomic performance of the new tax system
Overall tax burden
One of the most obvious macroeconomic consequences of the 2000 tax reform 
is the decrease of the overall tax burden. Total tax revenues, which exceeded 44 
percent of the GDP in the period between 1994 and 2000, decreased by more than 
3 percentage points in the period from 2001 to 2003 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1.
OVERALL TAX BURDEN, GENERAL GOVERNMENT, 1994 – 2003
(in % of BDP) 1994 – 2000 average 2001 – 2003 average difference
1 2 3 4 = 3 - 2
Tax revenues 44.1 40.8 -3.3
Personal income tax 5.7 3.9 -1.8
Corporate income tax 1.8 1.9 0.1
Taxes on goods and services 18.5 20.2 1.7
Social security contributions 13.9 12.8 -1.0
Other taxes 4.2 2.0 -2.2
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations
This favourable effect was mostly achieved through the fall in other taxes, 
and among them, the greatest contribution to that decrease of the tax burden came 
from the customs duties that went down after Croatia signed a number of free trade 
agreements and entered the WTO. A reduction of social security contributions, 
aimed at cutting down unit labour costs, resulted in the decrease in the overall tax 
burden by one percent of the GDP. The effect of the changes in the most radically 
reformed taxes (personal income tax, corporate income tax and taxes on goods and 
services) on the overall burden was neutral. As revenues from personal income tax 
decreased by 1.8 percent in terms of GDP in the period after the tax reform, the 
government had to compensate the loss of revenue by increasing revenues from 
taxes on goods and services (i.e. excise taxes) by the same amount. 
Development of revenues from personal and corporate income taxes
It would be interesting to take a look at the evolution of personal and corpo-
rate income taxes in the period from 1994 onwards. Although not so signifi cant 
in the structure of total tax revenues, those taxes greatly infl uence perception of 
the country’s investment climate and usually indicate the theoretical background 
on which the entire tax system rests. In the 2000 tax reform, they were among the 
taxes that underwent major changes.
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Figure 1.
PERSONAL INCOME TAX REVENUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT, 
1994 - 2003, 1995 = 100
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations
After the 2000 slowdown caused by the (economic) recession, revenues from 
personal income tax continued to fall as a consequence of changes in the Personal 
Income Tax Act (see Figure 1)3. The reasons for the steady fall of personal income 
tax revenues are the increase in the basic personal allowance and the reduction of 
the lowest marginal tax rate. Both effects seem to offset the positive impact of the 
introduction of third and fourth tax rates on tax revenues. The downward trend is 
expected to continue even in 2004, due to the introduction of non-standard tax relief 
Croatian taxpayers were able to claim in their 2003 tax returns. 
3 The Ministry of Finance does not publish quarterly data on general government accounts. 
Fiscal statistics according to the economic classifi cation are available on monthly basis for the con-
solidated central government, whereas for the local government the same data are available only on 
annual basis. The quarterly data used in this paper are constructed using monthly data on tax revenues 
for the consolidated central government, and adding estimates of quarterly tax revenues for the local 
government. Quarterly data on local government tax revenues are estimated using the assumption 
that the collection of local government revenues from personal and corporate income tax follows the 
same dynamics as the collection of consolidated government revenues from personal and corporate 
income tax. This assumption is based on the fact that both personal and corporate income taxes are 
taxes shared between the levels of government, and are levied on the same tax base. The timing of 
tax collection by the local and central government should, therefore, coincide. 
S. ŠVALJEK: The 200 Tax Reform in Croatia: Causes and Consequences
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (12) 1217-1236 (2005) 1223
The development of corporate income tax revenues follows the opposite trend. 
Like with personal income tax, corporate income tax revenues also faced certain 
slowdown during the recessionary 2000, but then recovered and even started to rise 
in real terms. It is evident that the lower statutory tax rate introduced by the 2000 
tax reform did not reduce the burden of corporate income taxes, and that the new 
corporate income tax per se could not therefore create a stimulus to investment.
Figure 2.
CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT, 
1994 - 2003, 1995 = 100
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations
The same can be seen if we express the revenue from personal and corporate 
income taxes in terms of GDP. The share of revenue from personal income tax, 
which ranged between 5 and 6½ percent of the GDP on quarterly basis before the 
tax reform, went down to 4 percent after the introduction of the changes in personal 
income tax rates and then began to fall even further (see Figure 3). At the same 
time, revenues from corporate income taxes rose from below 1 to more than 2½ 
percent of the GDP on quarterly basis during the period 1994-2000, fell rapidly to 
1 percent of the GDP at the end of that period and then started to recover, reaching 
2 percent of the GDP in 2003. The data on corporate income tax revenue cannot 
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confi rm any problems with revenue generation from that source prior to 2000, and 
surely cannot prove that the corporate income tax reform brought any signifi cant 
relief to enterprises. 
Figure 3.
PERSONAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX REVENUES IN % OF GDP, 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT, 1994 - 2003
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations
Average elasticity and average rate of personal income tax
One of the criticisms against the pre-2000 tax system was that it did not take 
into account the economic situation of the taxpayers, failing to make any signifi cant 
differences in the relative tax burden between the rich and the poor. The goal of the 
tax reform was to insist on equality in taxation. This should have been achieved 
through a more pronounced tax progression, i.e. mainly through the introduction 
of two additional marginal tax rates of personal income tax. 
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The data on personal income tax (together with surtax on personal income 
tax) and income by income brackets allow us to calculate the average constant 
elasticity as a measure of tax progression. Any elasticity above 1 indicates tax 
progression, and the higher the elasticity, the higher the progression4. Table 2 
presents the average constant elasticities of personal income tax for all taxpayers 
and for the subgroup of employees for the period between 1995 and 2002, and the 
averages for two sub-periods – the one before the tax reform and the other after 
the beginning of the tax reform. 
It is evident that for both, all taxpayers and employees, personal income tax 
was progressive even before the tax reform. However, the tax elasticity in the second 
sub-period increased signifi cantly in comparison with that before the 2000 tax re-
form, indicating stronger tax progression in the period after the 2000 tax reform. 
Table 2.
AVERAGE CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
AND SURTAX AND AVERAGE TAX BURDEN, 1995 - 2002
Average constant elasticity Average tax burden
all taxpayers employees all taxpayers employees
1995 1.75 1.52 11.9 12.8
1996 1.69 1.50 12.9 14.0
1997 1.76 1.67 10.8 12.0
1998 1.53 1.57 11.4 13.3
1999 1.74 1.39 9.5 11.5
2000 1.68 1.68 9.0 10.8
2001 1.94 1.78 7.5 8.9
2002 1.84 1.75 7.5 9.5
1995 – 2000
average 1.69 1.56 10.9
12.4
2001 – 2002
average 1.89 1.77 7.5 9.2
Source: Tax Administration, author’s calculations
4 A detailed description of the calculation of average constant elasticity using the Tax Admin-
istration data can be found in Madžarević-Šujster (2001). The formula used in this paper for the 
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It can also be observed that higher relative taxation was not accomplished 
through higher average taxation of those in the higher income brackets. On the 
contrary, even for those in high income brackets the average tax rate decreased, 
but this decrease was less pronounced than for those in the lower income brackets. 
Figure 4 and Table A1 in the Appendix show that for almost all the income brackets 
the average personal income tax burden went down, lowering also the average tax 
burden of all taxpayers and all employees. It is only the degree of the reduction 
of the average tax burden that differs between those in the lower and those in the 
higher income brackets. Those who profi ted most, i.e. those whose average tax 
rate decreased by 50 percent or more, were the taxpayers earning between 800 
and 4,000 kuna net per month, i.e. those employees whose monthly wages ranged 
between 1,000 and 3,500 kuna net per month. The average tax rate increased only 
for the employees earning more than 20,000 kuna net per month. 
The reason why almost all those obliged to pay personal income tax were 
better off after the 2000 tax reform can again be found in the increase of the basic 
personal allowance and the reduction of the lowest marginal income tax rate to 15 
percent, but also in the fact that the highest marginal tax rate of 45 percent applies 
only to a relatively high tax base of 21,000 kuna per month.
It seems that the same level of tax progression could have been attained 
through a higher level of the average tax rate, i.e. so that those in the higher in-
come brackets would have to pay higher taxes than before. This would imply the 
government’s stronger reliance on direct taxes and less need for turning to other 
sources of fi nancing. The government, however, chose to increase excise taxes to 
compensate for the loss of revenues from personal income tax. 
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Figure 4.
AVERAGE TAX RATE BY INCOME BRACKETS, 1995 – 2000 
AVERAGE/ 2001 – 2002 AVERAGE, % CHANGE
Source: Tax Administration, author’s calculations
Structure of tax revenues
The previous tax system was often criticised for a high share of inherently 
regressive tax forms (like VAT and excise taxes) as compared to the progressive tax 
forms and, by the same token, for a high share of indirect in comparison with direct 
taxes. Table 3 shows what happened to the tax structure after the 2000 tax reform 
in that respect, if looking only at the major groups of tax revenues (personal and 
corporate income taxes, social security contributions and domestic indirect taxes). 
Although just the opposite would be expected, the share of indirect taxes rose after 
the reform, while the share of explicitly direct taxes fell signifi cantly. 
The move towards greater progression of the whole tax system brought about 
by a greater progression of personal income tax was simply offset by an increase 
S. ŠVALJEK: The 200 Tax Reform in Croatia: Causes and Consequences
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (12) 1217-1236 (2005)1228
in indirect taxes. It has to be mentioned that the share of indirect taxes in tax rev-
enues rose mostly due to the rise in excise taxes. It can be argued that many of the 
excises are also progressive in their nature since they are paid on more luxurious 
goods, but it seems that the reason for relying on the excises was not to make the 
tax system more progressive, but to exploit them as an easy and effi cient way to 
provide extra revenues for the government. 
Table 3.





Personal and corporate income taxes 18.7 14.9
Social security contributions 34.8 33.1
Domestic indirect taxes 46.5 52.0
Source: Ministry of Finance, author’s calculations
Tax incentives and FDI: what can be learned?
In order to fulfi l the goal of stimulating investment (most importantly foreign 
direct investment, often viewed as a panacea) through tax measures, the coalition 
government made tax incentives one of the key elements of the tax reform. The 
tax system introduced in 1994 initially provided only one important tax incentive 
– deduction for the imputed cost of equity, or the so-called protective interest 
deduction (Offi cial Gazette NN/109/1993). As it was perceived as a very gener-
ous incentive, which did not discriminate in any way, there seemed to be no need 
for adding extra incentives to the corporate income taxation act. However, the 
temptation to introduce new tax incentives was high, so that more or less impor-
tant incentives were introduced even before 2000, gradually eroding the base of 
corporate income tax. In 1996, new tax concessions were introduced in form of 
reduced corporate income tax rates in the areas of special state concern and “free 
zones” (NN/44/1996). After that, in 2000, fi rst the Investment Promotion Act al-
lowed the application of a reduced rate of corporate income tax for certain types 
of new investments (NN/73/2000), and then the reform of corporate income tax 
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introduced additional tax incentives in form of double deductions from the taxable 
base of wages of newly employed persons, and full asset depreciation provisions 
(NN/127/2000). In 2003, enterprises were given additional tax incentives for R&D 
and professional training (NN/163/2003). 
Table 4.
TAX INCENTIVES IN SUPPORT OF INVESTMENT INTRODUCED 
AND IN FORCE SINCE 1994
Type of incentive 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Deduction for the imputed cost 
of equity (protective interest 
deduction)




Tax incentives for employment
Accelerated depreciation of capital 
costs
Tax incentives for R&D and 
professional training
* Note: provided with the discretionary powers of the Government to increase tax concessions 
in “exceptional cases”.
It is clear from Table 4,which shows major tax incentives and periods of their 
application, that ever since 1996 more and more tax incentives have been added to 
the list, and that once introduced into the system they have remained there. The only 
tax incentive that was eventually removed is the deduction of protective interest, 
which was abolished by the 2000 tax reform. While the criticism that protective 
interest is uncommon and incomparable with tax systems in other countries may 
be true, it could be safely said that it was replaced by the tax incentives that are 
mostly biased and available only for specifi c investments, and can therefore be 
characterised as being inferior to protective interest.
It would be interesting to see how the newly introduced tax incentives infl u-
enced foreign investors’ decisions to invest in Croatia and any survey that could 
help provide the answer would be more than welcome. However, in the absence of 
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on FDI fl ows to Croatia, and evidence provided by various surveys conducted for 
groups of comparable countries5. The data on FDI fl ows to Croatia (see Table 5) 
reveal that Croatia attracted relatively small proportion of total FDI that came to 
Central and South Eastern Europe from 1994 to 2002, but at the same time their 
share in FDI fl ows to South Eastern Europe was rather high, i.e. between 14 and 
46 percent. 
In 1996 FDI fl ows to Croatia were as high as USD 500 million, which doubled 
in 1998 and tripled in 1999. No important changes in corporate income taxation 
occurred neither between 1997 and 1998 nor between 1998 and 1999, so that the 
reasons for the change in the size of FDI fl ows to Croatia have to be sought outside 
the tax system. Similarly, FDI in 2001 (after the tax reform) were almost of the same 
size as in 1999 (before the tax reform), and the 2000 tax reform obviously did not 
do much to enhance the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors.
Table 5.
FDI FLOWS INTO CENTRAL AND SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE, 
1994 - 2002, IN MILLIONS OF USD
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Central and South Eastern 
Europe* 6200 14613 13538 20806 22481 25145 26373 25026 28624
South Eastern Europe** 669 816 1111 3151 3908 3704 3737 4631 3906
Croatia 117 114 511 533 932 1467 1089 1561 1124
 - in % of total fl ows to 
Central and South Eastern 
Europe
1.9 0.8 3.8 2.6 4.1 5.8 4.1 6.2 3.9
 - in % of total fl ows to South 
Eastern Europe 17.5 14.0 46.0 16.9 23.8 39.6 29.1 33.7 28.8
Notes: *Central and South Eastern Europe includes following countries: Poland, Czech Repub-
lic, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Croatia, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, TFRY Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, 
Albania and Serbia and Montenegro. ** South Eastern Europe includes following countries: Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia, TFRY Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and 
Serbia and Montenegro
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001 and 2003; www.unctad.org/fdistatistics
5 See two recent documents (Emerging Markets Economics, 2003) and OECD (2003). 
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Some recent surveys have found that taxation or tax-based incentives play only 
a minor role in the choice of an investment location (EME 2003; OECD 2003). Their 
results show that tax issues are of greater importance for strategic investors than for 
opportunistic investors6. Contrary to the views held by most government offi cials, 
investors are mostly concerned about stability, predictability and transparency of 
tax systems. Moreover, excessive “stacking” of corporate tax incentives and other 
incentives increase complexity, thus increasing compliance and administrative 
costs, lead to ineffi ciencies in resource allocation, may contribute to concerns over 
sovereign risk and cast doubts over basic “enabling conditions”.
Both the data on FDI fl ows and the relevant recent literature, support the con-
clusion that foreign direct investment fl ows to Croatia intensifi ed once the political 
situation became stable in the second half of the 1990s (EME 2003; OECD 2003). 
In addition, sizeable FDI fl ows were experienced only in the years when massive 
privatisation processes were underway, such as privatisation of the Croatian Tel-
ecom, large state-owned banks or INA (national oil and gas company). Since most 
of FDI fl ows into Croatia resulted from privatisation opportunities and were in 
that respect “opportunistic” in their nature, they would have probably taken place 
irrespective of the characteristics of the tax system. 
There are some important lessons in regard to the connection between tax 
systems and FDI that can surely be learned from the Croatian experience in the past 
decade and from the experience of other countries. Firstly, although tax incentives 
might seem very appealing, they should be avoided since they may have unwanted 
effects on tax revenues and tax system transparency. Secondly, special tax incen-
tives are either not taken into account by potential foreign investors or may even 
discourage investment (see e.g. OECD, 2003). In the third place, investors’ location 
choices are made on the basis of non-tax criteria such as political and economic 
stability, size and growth of the market, stability of the legal framework and the 
rule of law or absence of bureaucratic obstacles. Finally, if tax matters are taken 
into account by potential investors, the transparency and stability of the tax system 
are considered as the most important tax issues (see e.g. EME, 2003). 
6 Here “strategic” refers to those investors whose investment decisions are made on the basis 
of wider investment considerations, such as securing presence in markets with the potential over time 
to become sizeable by international standards, maximising competitive advantages of scale or cost 
of production, or how the country fi ts with the wider global business strategy in terms of supplying 
goods and services to a particular region. “Opportunistic” investors, alternatively, focus on assess-
ing a target investment on the basis of its profi tability and do not perform comparative assessments 
of countries as the opportunity is usually specifi c to a time and place. What they hope to identify is 
unique projects that provide high levels of risk-adjusted returns over a short period of time (EME 
2003, p. 12).
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Conclusion
This paper focused on aggregate effects of the 2000 tax reform, and came up 
with some useful fi ndings. It showed that the overall tax burden decreased signifi -
cantly since the tax system underwent important changes in 2001. It also found out 
that after the 2000 tax reform progression of personal income tax rose due to the 
introduction of a third and after that a fourth marginal tax rate. However, a higher 
basic personal tax allowance and a decrease of the lowest marginal personal income 
tax rate brought about the fall in the average tax rate and in personal income tax 
revenues. At the same time, corporate income tax revenues recovered after 2000 
and then remained stable at the level of 2 percent of the GDP. The analysis of tax 
revenues revealed that the share of direct taxes within the total tax revenues went 
down after 2000 although the intention of the tax reform seemed to be just the op-
posite. The analysis also focused on the evolution of tax incentives during the last 
ten years, showing how their number increased continuously. On the one hand, this 
certainly led to increased complexity of the tax system and tax base erosion while, 
on the other hand, there was no evidence that the accumulation of tax incentives 
played any role in encouraging FDI infl ows.  
The analysis presented in this paper has not exhausted research possibilities 
on the topic of characteristics and effects of the tax system before and after 2000 
tax reform. There are many aspects of the tax reform that should be the subject of 
research and analysis, such as the effect of the tax changes on the marginal effective 
tax rate, impact of the tax changes on different types of investment, the relationship 
between the introduction of tax incentives on investment decisions and the burden 
of tax compliance and effect of the tax changes on the distribution of income and 
wealth. Even a basic analysis, such as the one whose results are presented here, 
indicates that the actual economic consequences of tax changes may be quite differ-
ent from intended effects if the policymakers are not ex ante aware of the potential 
mechanisms that may be triggered off by various tax policy measures. 
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POREZNA REFORMA IZ GODINE 2000. U HRVATSKOJ: 
UZROCI I POSLJEDICE
Sažetak
Ovaj je rad nastao s ciljem da se identifi ciraju osnovne značajke hrvatskoga poreznog 
sustava (npr. razina prikupljenih poreznih prihoda, ukupno porezno opterećenje, stupanj pro-
gresivnosti poreznog sustava i struktura poreznih prihoda) nakon porezne reforme provedene 
2000. godine. U radu se uspoređuje novi porezni sustav s poreznim sustavom koji je bio na 
snazi od 1994. do 2000. godine, a također se postavlja pitanje jesu li izmjenama poreznog 
sustava ostvareni ciljevi porezne reforme. Pažnja je posvećena i postupnoj eroziji poreznih 
osnovica poreza na dohodak i dobitak, te prošlim, sadašnjim i budućim posljedicama takve 
porezne erozije stvaranju “pogodnog okruženja” za izravna strana ulaganja.
Ključne riječi: porezna reforma, porezno opterećenje, progresivnost, izrava stra-
naulagn
